Monday 24 February 2014

Gurumurthy Kalyanaram on False Claim Act Anti-Retaliation Provision

Relators in False Claim lawsuit quite often also incorporate the retaliation complaint. Gurumruthy Kalyanaram presents the decisions by various Courts on many FCA anti-retaliation lawsuits.

Gurumurthy Kalyanaram





Employee reports of government fraud being committed by employers are a critical source of information.  For this reason, the False Claims Act provides broad protection for employees from retaliation for any activities “in furtherance of” a possible FCA claim. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).  The statute is interpreted broadly, to cover any investigations and inquiries where the relator’s purpose was aimed at exposing a fraud upon the government, whether or not the relator has a winning claim or ever files a claim.  The public interest should be preserved over the private interests of both employees and employers.

“In crafting whistle-blower protections, Congress aimed to make employees feel more secure in reporting fraud to the United States. Employees who investigate and supply information concerning the fraudulent practices of an employer are protected from retaliation, whether the employee or the government brings suit against the employer.” (Also Read : Gurumurthy Kalyanaram Reports on U.S. Government’s Compelling Interest in a False Claims Act )

Cell Therapeutics Inc. v. Lash Group Inc., 586 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 2010) “Congress intended to protect employees from retaliation while they are collecting information about a possible fraud, before they have put all the pieces of the puzzle together.” Fanslow v. Chic. Mfg. Ctr., Inc., 384 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 863 (7th Cir. 1994) and U.S. ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); U.S. ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 318 F.3d 1199, 1212-1215 (10th Cir. 2003).

“The Committee believes that the amendments . . . which allow and encourage assistance from the private citizenry can make a significant impact on bolstering the Government’s fraud enforcement effort. . . . [T]he Committee seeks to halt companies . . . from using the threat of economic retaliation to silence ‘whistleblowers’, as well as assure those who may be considering exposing fraud that they are legally protected from retaliatory acts. . . Protected activity should therefore be interpreted broadly.”  Sen. Rpt. 99-345, at 8, 34 (1986), reprinted, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273, and 5299.

These precedents should provide a framework for analysis of lawsuit in this domain.

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